Crossroads - Higher education review submission

Decreased funding for increased workloads and student numbers is a recipe for disaster opines the CPSU-SPSF in it's submission to Crossroads, the Federal Government's review of higher education. Read the full submission below.

Governance, management and workplace relations:

A focal point of the Ministerial Discussion Paper is that of ` governance, management and workplace relations'. According to the paper `traditional academic cultures and industrial structures can operate together to restrict the ability of universities to make the most of new opportunities'. The Ministerial Paper suggests that internal operations of universities impede efficiency and effectiveness. It suggests that attention needs to be given to staff productivity, the better management of course offerings and a lack of responsiveness with little indication of reviewing and refreshing offerings. This appears to not only deny the effect of funding cuts on the operation of universities but also appears to allocate blame for inefficiencies to the workforce. The CPSU is however a little perplexed about these claims when other Government reports indicate quite different results. The Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs Report for the 1999 to 2001 Triennium states that:-

`Australia's higher education sector is in good shape.........p25

The report then goes on the produce statistical information on quality. It states that the :-

Percentage of students satisfied with their course overall ( 1996) 89%
Percentage of students satisfied with their acquisition of generic skills ( 1996) 86%
Percentage of students satisfied with the quality of their teaching (1996) 75%
Graduate Destination Survey which demonstrates the ease with which new graduates are absorbed into the labour market.
Tertiary qualified spends less time unemployed. P17

These findings would appear to be at odds with the statement made in the Ministerial paper.

The Ministerial paper also suggests that `a culture of pattern bargaining restricts management discretion and induces uniformity of conditions' Pattern type bargaining, undermines the very basis of enterprise bargaining. The paper then asks how enterprise bargaining can be made more effective and suggests further de-centralisation to the Faculty and individual level.(p29).

In the first part of this Submission we address several issues that seek to discuss the problems of enterprise bargaining and to answer the question canvassed in the discussion paper `how can enterprise bargaining be made more effective'? We examine the experience of enterprise bargaining and its appropriateness in the higher education sector and we discuss the issue of bargaining levels, forms of industrial instruments and their perceived effect on workplace efficiency.

To begin with we ask the question: Is enterprise bargaining appropriate in the higher education Sector? Unlike the private sector where bargained wage increases can be adjusted for through various means, in a publicly funded education system there is little capacity to make enterprise bargaining operational. Bargaining in universities occurs within a fixed pie. This problem has been further compounded by the fact that enterprise bargaining in the higher education sector has taken place within a `shrinking pie'. The decision in 1996 by the Government not supplement agreed wage rises meant that universities had to absorb negotiated wage increases. A leading internationally recognized expert in the higher education field supports this view and has argued that enterprise bargaining is not appropriate in public university system. Professor Bruce Chapman, in his submission to the West Review argued that enterprise bargaining increased pressure for both staff cuts and non-government sources of revenue:

`The essential problem with the application of enterprise bargaining regime to what is basically a publicly funded system is that, unlike the application of enterprise bargaining in the private sector, there are no instruments available to make the arrangements operational. Universities in an enterprise bargaining situation face the unpalatable option of a fixed pie: they can, for example, choose to give salaried staff a pay rise to maintain real incomes, but if this option is taken something else has to give, such as the layoff of staff. And in the context of governments not being willing to increase or even maintain real levels of higher education expenditure, enterprise bargaining system inevitably exerts significant pressure for the sector to find independent funding sources'. (Universities in Crisis' p51).

As recently as September 2001, the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education Reference Committee Report `Universities in Crisis' found that Commonwealth government policy had effectively limited the funding for wage rises negotiated under enterprise bargaining arrangements. The report stated that:

`the recent Government policy of offering universities up to 2 per cent of operating grants for supplementation of wage increases, contingent on the achievement of specified workplace reforms including performance rewards for staff and increased flexibility in the use of facilities and resources is no solution to the problem of under-funding of salary increases. The imposition of ideologically driven policies on universities in return for funding is at odds with the Governments' broader stated policy of allowing universities autonomy to develop their own responses to local needs and circumstances. In addition, it has complicated the process of enterprise bargaining, reducing morale and wasting valuable time in many universities. It also rests on a number of false assumptions about the scope for productivity gains in institutions' (Universities in Crisis op cit p51-52)'

It may be concluded therefore that this form of `restricted' enterprise bargaining in the higher education sector is in itself inefficient because it is an inappropriate bargaining regime in an inadequately publicly funded system which cannot adjust, like the private sector, to changed economic relations between employers and employees.

Decentralisation and Individual Agreements:

Having considered the financial inappropriateness of enterprise bargaining regime and its exasperation caused by the lack of sufficient funding one must also consider the nature of bargaining itself. The inefficiencies of a de-centralised bargaining regime need to be considered. Bargaining is a distributive process - it is about someone trying to achieve something that another has. Bargaining is therefore inherently conflictual and often is adversarial. Bargaining is a long process, it is time consuming, involves debates and often industrial action. Greater devolution requires more actors to become involved and in many cases these actors are unfamiliar to negotiation processes and legal frameworks. For an agreement to be reached and accepted the process must be seen to be fair, equal and be bargained in good faith. For bargaining to be effective is must be mutually satisfying process. One party should not dominate over the other. The Ministerial paper argues that industrial structures and cultures in the form of pattern bargaining `undermine the very basis of enterprise bargaining'. It is therefore alarming to the CPSU that the Ministerial paper identifies pattern bargaining as `restricting management discretion'. It would seem that the preferred form of bargaining is not one of true, fair and equal bargaining but one where one party, that of management, maintains authority in what appears to be a fictional process. Are proposals for an `effective, decentralized process' a mask for unimpeded managerial dominance of bargaining and of the setting of workplace wages, conditions and practices?

The Ministerial Paper further suggests that pattern type bargaining is counterproductive when `locally agreed enterprise bargaining outcomes can be over-ruled by the union's national office operating as gatekeeper'. This statement appears to have little knowledge of industrial relations practices and ratification of agreement process. It infact confuses the separate issues of bargaining levels, industrial practices and issues of national union authority.

While the paper confuses bargaining levels with industrial practices the Reference Group need to be aware that freedom to bargain at any level be it national, industry or workplace level is considered to be a basic human right and a core labour standard set out in Convention Number 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation. Any prohibition on the form of bargaining is a violation of workers rights to freely organise and collectively bargain.

The Ministerial Paper proposes greater use of individual agreements (AWAs) and suggests that individual agreements will make workplace relations more flexible. We submit that this is an unfounded assumption based upon ideological beliefs of how the employment relation should be based. The argument advanced in the Paper is that an industrial instrument effects workplace productivity and efficiency. In the face of such unfounded assumptions we need to examine empirical evidence of the effect of AWAs in workplace relations.

AWAs were introduced into the Federal industrial relations system in 1996 and since then they have been wholly unpopular and unsuccessful despite current Federal government policy to encourage their use. They cover a very small percentage of the workforce, only about 2%. AWAs are individual agreements and therefore unions cannot be a party to the agreement. A recent study by David Plowman `Awards, Certified Agreements and AWAs - Some Reflections', April 2002, ACIRRT Working Paper indicates that `employers interest in AWAs may be based upon an assumed rather than proven notion of flexibility. There interest is more likely to arise out in a reduced role for unions and the capacity to formalize relation in the increasing non-union sectors of the economy'. The paper concludes that although AWAs are more flexible than multi-employer awards, their flexibility relative to single employer awards/agreements is unproven. It is argued that the collectivist nature of the AWAs diminishes their relative capacity for flexibility (Plowman 2002).

Dick Crozier from Australian Business Ltd. ACIRRT Working Paper `Do individual and collective agreement make a difference' a longitudinal study of agreement making and their effect on workplaces, found on the question of the effect of the form of agreement on profitability and labour productivity, that managements responses were that 35 per cent reported improved profitability and 40 per cent reported improved productivity. However, changes to the organization, work culture, products or services, improved skill and motivated workforce were considered to be more influential. The form of agreement does not usually cause productivity or profitability improvements - these improvements arise from a multiplicity of factors. A majority of respondents were unable to confirm that their agreement had a positive impact on the achievement of various goals (Crozier 2002).

As indicated the instrument of regulation of the workplace appears to have little impact on the workplace flexibility or workpractices. Awards, agreements and AWAs all have the ability to cater for particular work arrangements. It would appear to us that the Ministers desire to institute AWAs and further de-centralisation is more directed to de-unionising the workforce and eroding wages and conditions of workers rather than seeking better workpractices. We turn to the effect of AWAs on wages and conditions of workers.

Studies of AWAs indicate that while professional and managerial workers do not seem to be disadvantaged in AWAs, other workers covered by AWAs have had worse wage outcomes than other forms of agreements and they have also been subject to an erosion of working conditions. Wages data collected on the ADAM database found that AWAs are less likely to include quantifiable wage increases during the term of the agreement than collective agreements. Workers on AWAs are exposed to the risk of not receiving a wage increase during the life of the agreement. This is a significant fact when one considers that AWAs can have a lifetime of 3 years.

Studies of AWAs not only indicate a poorer wage outcome but also a reduction in working conditions and non-wage benefits. AWAs are less likely to include penalty and overtime rates for working long and unsocial hours. They are far more likely than union agreements to contain provisions which reduce the payment for non-standard work hours arrangements. (Van Barneveld & Arsovska 2002:17) A further study conducted by the Western Australian Commissioner of Workplace Agreements found that individual agreements reduce or eliminate significant conditions of work. It found that 50% of individual agreements reduced or eliminated conditions such as overtime pay and penalty rates and that some employees lost two or more significant conditions (Bailey and Horstman 1999)

Another aspect of AWAs is that there is a fundamental difference between the way they link performance to pay increases from that of collective agreements. Collective agreements have a more team or group focus whereas AWAs are more likely to link increases to individual performance measurement. We would submit that for a individual performance pay system to operate effectively and fairly and be accepted by the workforce it must be properly administered by those having proper knowledge to do so, that the process must be objective and fair and that it must allow participants in the appraisal system to contest and appeal decisions. It would seem that in the higher education sector, those in staff management positions such as Heads of Schools and Deans who would be asked to perform such functions under a de-centralised, individualized pay system, do not have the knowledge or expertise to perform such a function in efficient or fair manner. We would also suggest such a process would expend much of the time of Heads of Schools and Deans and therefore would not be cost effective. The process of negotiating an AWA, if one does exist, has the propensity to create more conflictual work relations as it personalizes wage bargaining.

Furthermore, the Workplace Relations Act requires that AWAs be subject to the `no disadvantage test'. For workers to be satisfied that they are not disadvantaged and for the system to operate fairly and efficiently, the process must be quick and transparent and the test must be applied within the spirit of which it was intended. The Employment Advocate said recently that they would only do `spot checks' as the office dealt with 6,000 AWAs month and that they `do not necessarily go through every single AWA that we receive and do a no-disadvantage test assessment'. (Workforce:2002). We would submit that this is a major failure in ensuring the protection of conditions for many workers and that it not only undermines the efficiency of AWAs but also undermines the standing of such a system in the mind of workers. The vetting of AWAs and the application of the No Disadvantage Test must reflect the purpose of the Act which is to guarantee workers an independent assessment of agreements and ensure that their wages and conditions of work are not undermined. If the answer to this problem of vetting agreements for a large workforce is merely to introduce standardised AWAs then one must then doubt the purpose of introducing individual agreements and view this proposal as purely an attempt to de-unionise the workforce and indiviudalise the work relationship.

How then can enterprise bargaining be made more effective? Effective enterprise bargaining can only be achieved if an appropriate level of public funding is restored and where true good faith bargaining takes place in a fair and equal process in which neither party controls the agenda. A situation where workers feel that they are stakeholders in an agreed outcome. We therefore recommend that workers be able to freely organize and bargain collectively at the level they desire and that the Federal government supplement unfunded salary increases by restoring funding to universities.

We therefore submit that further decentralization and greater use of AWAs in the higher education sector will not improve workplace relations or make the bargaining process more efficient.

The Workplace

In this part of our submission we focus on the workplace, the way it functions and the experiences of our members. In particular we discuss the failure of general staff levels to keep pace with increasing student numbers and increased workload levels. We also focus on the changing nature of the employment in the industry in the form of an increasing casual workforce. We conclude these factors have had a detrimental impact on the delivery of quality services at universities and on gender equality in the workplace.

As discussed above and as made clear in the Senate Report `Universities in Crisis' public funding to universities has declined. At the same time there has been an increase in both domestic and international students.
In the period 1991 to 2000 there has been an approximately 30 per cent increase in students numbers while during the same period the growth of of full-time, fractional and casual staff has been approximately 12.1 per cent (DETYA:2001Table1p11). Universities have witnessed declines in both academic to student and general staff to student ratios. In 1991 the general staff to student ratio was one general staff member to 11.2 students, by 2000 this ratio had increased to 1 to 13.7. (DEYTA:1999). Table 49).

Reductions in funding, greater numbers of students and a failure maintain adequate general and academic staff levels has had a detrimental impact on work and the workplace. Qualitative and quantitative data reveal that general staff are working harder. The decreasing number of general staff has lead to remaining staff experiencing a 22 per cent increase in workload since 1991(DETYA 1999 table 49). As mentioned above, where there used to be one general staff member for every 11.2 students, by 2000 this ratio had increased to 1 to 13.7. The NTEU workload survey found that general staff now faced particular problems with work intensification, that increased levels of contact with students, other staff and external agencies were key drivers of increased workloads for general staff. ( NTEU 2001submission p.8)

CPSU Survey 2001

The decline in working conditions is verified by CPSU members and staff in the course of their routine work. In order to further elucidate these trends, a Survey `Have Your Say" of general staff members in all states was conducted in 2001. Members were surveyed on issues of hours of work, paid and unpaid, workloads and staffing levels. The results follow:

Hours
Relatively few (15 percent) of respondents reported that they were working more paid overtime in the past five years - of this number 37 percent work 20 or more hours per month.

The situation becomes more interesting when we examine the increase in unpaid overtime. More than two-thirds (66 percent) of respondents reported working unpaid overtime - and of these nearly half (44 percent) are working more than 20 hours per month. The principal means of compensating unpaid overtime is to allow time to be taken off "in lieu".

The graphs below highlight the increasing incidence and numbers of hours of paid and unpaid work being performed.

There is ample evidence to suggest that there is an intensification is of work with more than three-quarters (77 percent) of respondents reporting that the increased workload creates difficulty in accessing conditions under their enterprise agreement such as "flexidays", RDOs and being able to take time off in lieu. This results in employees having to forfeit these entitlements. Slightly more than half of the respondents said that they were doing the same work but in a shorter time period. A comment from a respondent illustrates this

• "(W)e do more work, have greater output with fewer staff. We do this by

Women General Staff
Women constitute about 60 percent of general staff covered by the SPSF Group of the CPSU, and the respondents to this survey closely reflect that (56 percent of respondents were women).

Despite this fact however, male employees are disproportionately working more paid overtime. Half of those undertaking paid overtime are male and men constitute approximately only 40 percent of the general staff workforce, indicating a clear gender imbalance in this area.

When it comes to unpaid overtime, the gender composition of general staff is reflected with women workers being 60 percent of those undertaking this work. However, women are not only working longer hours than pre-1996 for no extra remuneration, but are also undertaking the vast majority of all types of unpaid work. In workplaces where a small amount of unpaid overtime is worked (up to 5 hours a month), women employees undertake all of this work. Additionally, two-thirds of those working up to 20 hours a week of unpaid overtime are women and women workers also make up over half (56 percent) of those working more than 20 hours a week unpaid overtime.

As women are still the primary carers in families, these statistics provide an indication of women struggling to combine ever-increasing workloads with family responsibilities. Additionally, universities have adopted policies designed to enable employees to combine work and family commitments, and these increasing workloads do little to realise these policies.

Staffing levels

When it comes to staffing levels three-quarters (74 percent) of respondents reported that there had been instances in their workplaces where staff had not been replaced when they left, resulting in a more work for the remaining staff and a reduction in "customer (student) services". In some cases this is losing the university business and a typical respondent stated that "due to lower staff levels we are unable to provide the same level of service - customers go elsewhere. We are unable to compete" (sic). In some instances this forces students to use private providers for these services. Another respondent states that services have been reduced "but we have to tell clients (students) that it is a new improved service that they will benefit from - by doing things themselves". Such attitudes are not uncommon amongst respondents.

Resources

Finally, we turn to look at the question of the adequacy of resources that are available to general staff to enable them to do the job. Almost half

(44.5 percent) reported that resources were not sufficient to enable them to perform their jobs effectively. The criticism was of laboratory and
technical equipment, office and other equipment. One respondent stated that

"the buildings are dilapidated, the air-conditioning keeps breaking down and

Casualisation of the workforce

Increased casualisation of the higher education workforce has significant implications for the delivery of quality service to students, academics and the community but it also has a significant impact on the working conditions of general staff. The numbers of casual general university staff have dramatically increased over the last decade, from 2970 in 1991 to 5144 in 1999, from being 2.66% of all university staff to 6.32% of staff (see table below). When the numbers of just general staff are examined, the rate of casualisation is even more marked, with casual general staff as a percentage of total general staff increasing for 7.78 in 1991 to 13.02% in 1999(see table page 14) (DEYTA 2001).

The issue of casualisation of the workplace has significant implications for gender equity. The Australian labour force is characterised by one with a high percentage of workers caterorgised as `casual workers' approximately 26% - this is a very high proportion when compared to other industrialized countries. Casual work arrangements are typified by insecure, low paid work, that lacks of access to many work benefits such as training and promotion, various forms of leave and entitlements and conditions enjoyed by the permanent workforce. Women make up a large percentage of the casual workforce. In 1998 women made up 60 per cent of the casual workforce. We therefore submit that the current level of casual workers and predicted increase in this form of work will result in greater inequality in the workforce. The result being a dual workforce, some workers with one set of rights and entitlements and another sector of the workforce with inferior rights and conditions - we believe that this will have a disproportionate effect on women workers in the higher education sector.

We therefore submit that the abovementioned changes in the workplace which have resulted from fiscal restraint have had detrimental impact on the delivery of quality services and on equity in the workplace. Our survey suggests that our general staff membership are a dedicated group of employees who work excessive amounts of overtime which is not properly remunerated, in an environment where staff are not always replaced and where there are often long delays, in a physical environment and with equipment that could well do with updating. It is possible for organisations to continue functioning reasonably well by imposing upon the commitment and dedication of staff - but it is not possible in the long-term to run efficient, effective and high-quality tertiary institutions in this manner.

Conclusion:

In September 2001 the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education References Committee reported on Universities in Australia. We suggest that the Reference Group be referred to The Report `Universities in Crisis' which confirms much of what we have argued:-

`The Committee heard a wide range of evidence cataloguing the extremely serious effects of the reductions to the forward estimates for operating grants after 1996 and the decision to limit supplementation for overdue salary increases. The real purchasing power of universities' operating grants has been reduced by more than 20 per cent since 1996 at a time when some of the major cost drivers for universities - salary costs, costs of library purchases and information technology - have increased significantly. High levels of over-enrolment have further reduced the actual level of funding available per EFTSU.

There are several major consequences. There have been large reductions in the number of staff, as well as a shift from full-time to fractional and casual staff. .... Reduced funding and increased costs have also translated into a deteriorating financial position for many universities, with some now extremely vulnerable to any further changes in their circumstances. There is also clear evidence that universities are failing to meet national needs in terms of the production of graduates in some areas of national importance with serious effects for individuals, industry states and the nation (Universities in Crisis:64)'.

This submission has highlighted the inability and incapacity of universities to manage and serve increasing demand for high quality education in a competitive environment with reduced public funding. Reduced public funding has led to a decrease in staff numbers at universities and a decline in resources leading to reduced services and a lower quality of education provision to students.


We conclude and recommend to the inquiry:

That the cut backs in public funding to the Higher Education Sector has had a detrimental impact on the delivery of quality and equitable tertiary education.

That changes in the nature of employment in the industry which have been the result of decreased public investment has meant a reduction of wages, a diminution of conditions, an increase in workloads and greater gender inequality in the workforce.

That proposals to further de-centralise and individualise bargaining will not deliver greater efficiency and workplace reform and that when taken with cuts to public investment can only be interpreted as a method of further reducing wages and conditions and of de-unionising the workforce.

That for bargaining to be effective and true it must not be conducted in a process which is based on unproven and unfounded ideological assumptions about how workplace reform is achieved. Effective enterprise bargaining, workplace reform and the delivery of quality service can only be achieved if an appropriate level of public funding is restored.

We recommend that in order to gain full knowledge of the higher education sector that the membership of Reference Group should be expanded to include representatives from State Ministries of Education, representatives from major professional organizations such as law, medicine and teaching and representatives of staff and student associations.

We therefore recommend that the Federal government significantly expand public investment in higher education and that in order to make enterprise bargaining operational and effective they restore retrospectively, and for future negotiations, the full supplementation of negotiated wage increases.

References:

Bailey J and Horstman B (1999) `Some Outcomes Under the WA Workplace Agreements Legislation', paper presented at conference `Individual vs Collective Bargaining: Developments, Outcomes and Experiences in Australian Workplaces' Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, November-December

Burke, Gerald and David Phillips (2001) `The Implications of Recent Adjustments of Government Funding to Higher Education' mimeo, Monash University.

Chapman, Bruce (2001) `Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the Future of Australian Universities' May

Crozier, D. (2001) ACIRRT Working Paper `Do individual and collective agreement make a difference'

The Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs. `Characteristics and Performance Indicators of Higher Education Institutions 2000 Preliminary Report, table 25 at www.detya.gov.au/archive/highered/statistics/characteristics. 30th March, 2001.

The Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs. `Characteristics and Performance Indicators of Higher Education Institutions 2000 'Full-time Fractional and Actual Casual by Work Contract 1990-1999'

The Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs Report for the 1999 to 2001 Triennium.

DETYA. Students 1999, Selected Higher Education Statistics, table 49.

National Tertiary Education Union, 2001, Submission to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education References Committee, The Capacity of Public Universities to Meet Australia's Higher Education Needs'

David Plowman `Awards, Certified Agreements and AWAs - Some Reflections, April 2002, ACIRRT Working Paper

Response to Senate Estimates Question E365, 22nd February 2001 EWRSBE Hansard p168.

Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education References Committee.2001 `Universities in Crisis'

Van Barneveld,K and Arsovska,B 2002 `AWAs:Changing the Structure of Wages' ACIRRT Working Paper, Sydney University
.
Workforce Issue 1354, 7th June 2002, `Hamberger in a pickle'

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